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THE CONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES
THEORETICALLY,a rate of interest is a measure of an exchange
lation between present economic goods and future economic goods of
so nearly the same kind as to be, for the purposes of the exchange re-
lation, considered identical. In actual practice, the concept is almost
invariably purely monetary. Though interest rates the world over are
continually being expressed in terms of the convertible or inconvertible
currencies of various countries and in terms of metallic monetary
standards such as gold or silver, they are seldom expressed in terms of
any such non-monetary commodities as wheat or cotton or even in
terms of any 'composite' commodity whose p1-ice might 1)e assumed to
fluctuate with 'the general level of commodity prices'.
There are two essential elements in the interest concept. To derive
any rate of interest from a stated set of facts, we must know (1) what
is the ratio of the future quantity of money or other good, in which
the rate is to be expressed, to the present quantity for which it is being
exchanged, and (2) what is the length of. time elapsing between the
'present' and 'future' of the particular problem. For example, if a
lender gives up a present $10,000 in exchange for a promised pay-
ment of $11,025 two years from now and if he actually receives
the $11,025 at the expiration of the two years, the rate of interest which
he will have received during the two-year period will be 1054 per cent
biennially, or 105/4 per cent per two-year period.
If the lender had obtained the $11,025 at the end of the two-year
period by lending $10,000 for a payment of $10,500 at the end of the
first year, and then lending this $10,500 for a payment of $11,025 at
the end of the second year, he would be able to say not only that he had
realized 1054 per cent biennially during the two-year period but also
that he had realized 5 per cent annually during each of the one-year
periods. However, only by assuming that he had obtained the same
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rate in each of the two years could he accurately describe the rate
during the two-year period of the first case as 5 per cent per annum.
Unless such an assumption be made, the 5 per cent figure is a mere
'average'. It tells us nothing about the rates which either the lender
or the borrower should consider that he had actually realized in the
separate years. For example, if the lender could have obtained only
4 per cent per annum for a one-year loan, he must logically consider
that he is obtaining more than 5 per cent per annum for the second
year. Moreover, this same reasoning applies in its fullness to even
such an apparently clear-cut case as that in which a present $10,000 is
exchanged for $500 payable one year hence and $10,500 payable at
the end of two years. If the lender could have obtained only 4 per
cent per annum for a one-year loan, he must think of the $500 payment
as made up of $400 interest and $100 payment on the principal sum,
and of the $600 difference between $10,500 and $9,900 as one year's
interest on a loan of $9,900. 'Long time interest rates' are always mere
'averages' of short time rates.
At 5 per cent per annum, compounded annually, $10,000 would, in
two years, grow into $11,025. The $10,000 is the 'present value' of
$11,025 due two years hence with interest at 5 per cent per annum,
compounded annually. The 'present value' of a specified suni of future
money, due in a specified time, and upon the assumption of a particular
uniform rate of interest until the payment of the future sum and a
particular 'compounding period', is such a sum of present money as
would grow into the specified future sum, in the specified time, at the
specified rate of interest and with the specified 'compounding period'.
The concept is purely mathematical. The question whether the assump-
tions are, in fact, legitimate or absurd has nothing to do with the prob-
lem of calculating the 'present value'. If 6 per cent per annum had been
assumed as the rate of interest, instead of 5 per cent, the 'present value'
of the $11,025 due two years hence would have been $9,812.22+ in-
stead of $10,000. If 100 per cent per annum had been the assumed rate,
the'present value' would have been $2,756.25 instead of either
$9,812.22+ or $10,000. Having made these preliminary observations,
we are in position to discuss the meaning that must, be attached to the
'yield' of a 'bond'.
In the modern economic world the commonest examples of 'long
time interest rates' are furnished by the 'yields' of long term 'bonds'.26 BONDYIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
The typical bond is a promise to make a series of periodic 'interest'
payments (usually one every six months) and a payment of a 'prin-
cipal' sum at 'maturity'.1 The 'yield' of a bond selling at a specified
price is that rate of interest which, if it be assumed in order to obtain
the 'present values' of the various future payments, will make the sum
of such 'present values' equal the specified price of the bond.
If the reader will examine a 'bond table', he will find that if a 4 per
cent $100 bond, interest payable semi-annually, maturing in
years,sells for $97.68, it 'yield 5 per cent per annum'. However, since
ordinary bond tables give, as the annual yield, twice the semi-annual
yield, this '5 per cent per annum' means that the yield is per cent
per six months' period, compounded semi-annually.'0 But exactly what
does this semi-annual yield of 2percent mean? Like most mathe-
matical questions, this may be correctly answered in many ways, but
two seem peculiarly enlightening.
The price paid for the bond ($97.68) equals the sum of the 'present
values' of the five $2 'interest' payments and the $100 'principal' pay-
ment. The 'present value' of the $2 interest payment due six months
hence is
1 025or, to the nearest cent, $1.95. Similarly the present
value of the $2 interest payment clue one year henceis_$2.00 ,or$1.90,
(1.025)2
and the present value of the interest payment due eighteen months
hence is ,or$1.86. The present values, to the nearest cent,
of the five $2.00 interest payments are: $1.95, $1.90, $1.86, $1.81,
1 The semi-annual payments made to the investor are semi-annual payments and
nothing more. To term them 'interest payments' is somewhat misleading, but the
terminology is so thoroughly established, and in general so well understood, that
to speak of 'dividend payments' or to introduce some other term would probably
be more disturbing than to keep to the established usage. Similarly the 'principal'
of a bond is universally understood to mean the 'face' of the bond or the amount
payable at maturity (excluding the last coupon) and not the amount originally lent or
the amount later invested in the bond by any subsequent purchaser.
in The usual practice of the makers of bond books is to calculate the yields in terms
of the 'compounding period' and to assume that the compounding period equals the
time between interest payments. This yieldis then multiplied by the number of
compounding periods in a year and presented as a yield fterannum. Thisis a harmless
convention—ifunderstood. Of caurse2'/2percent compounded semi-annually
amounts to 100(1.0252_I)or 5.0625 per cent, and not 5 per cent, compounded
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$1.77. Similarly, the present value of the principal payment of $100,
due in 23/2 years, is $88.39. The total of these six present values is
$97.68, and this is therefore the price paid for the bond.
Another way of looking at the problem, which some persons find
even more enlightening, is the following: the buyer pays $97.68 for
the bond. If he is to receive per cent semi-annually on his invest-
ment, there will be owing to him, at the end of six months, 23/2 per
cent of $97.68, or $2.44.However,he accepts $2 (the 'interest' pay-
ment called for by the first 'coupon') and leaves the extra 44 cents with
the borrower to draw 23/2 per cent semi-annually. The borrower then
owes him $97.68 +$0.44,or $98.12. This now bears interest at 23/2
per cent semi-annually. And so forth. The procedure can be clearly
shown in a table.
Value of bond at time of purchase (price paid) $97.68
Accrued interest (2.3/2 per cent of 97.68) +2.44
Value of bond just before payment of first coupon 100.12
Payment of second coupon —2.00
Value of bond immediately after payment of first coupon 98.12
Accrued interest (272 per cent of $98.12) +2.45
Value of bond just before payment of second coupon 100.57
Payment of second coupon —2.00
Value of bond immediately after payment of second coupon 98.57
Accrued interest per cent of $98.57) + 2.46
Value of bond just before payment of third coupon 101.03
Payment of third coupon —2.00
Value of bond immediately after payment of third coupon 99.03
Accrued interest (23/2 per cent of $99.03) -J-2.48
Value of bond just before payment of I ourt'h coupon 101.51
Payment of fourth coupon —2.00
Value of bond immediately after payment of fourth coupon 99.51
Accrued interest (2'/2 per cent of $99.51) +2.4928 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
The amount the holder of the bond receives at maturity—$100.00
principal plus $2 interest (called for by the fifth coupon) 102.00
From the above illustrations the reader will notice that, though the
present value of a distant future payment is of course less than the
present value of a near payment, there is, in terms of dollars, only one
'yield' for the bond.2 The 'yield' is a single rate of interest such that
the present value of all the future payments, if they were caicqiated
by assuming this rate (with the semi-annual compounding conven-
tion), would equal the p1-ice paid for the bond. It is a technical mathe-
matical concept.3
In the illustration of the bond maturing in years, bought at
$97.68 and paying $2 semi-annually, which we have been using, a
naive and simple way of looking at the rate of interest would be to state
that for two years the buyer receives 2.047 per cent semi-annually on
his investment of $97.68,3a and then for six months receives 4.422
per cent semi-annually on his investment (still $97.68)Finally,at the
expiration of the last six months, he also receives the return of his
loan, namely $97.68.Or, using the semi-annual compounding con-
vention of the bond tables, the bond would be thought of as paying
4.094 per cent per annum for two years and then 8.844 per cent per
annum for six months. However, neither of these figures is the 'yield'
of the bond. The bond has only one yield, namely, 5 per cent per
annum. The 'yield' isa species of 'average'.5
2Assuming,of course, that the compounding periodisstated—as, for example,
quarterly, semi-annually, or annually.In our discussion we are assuming semi-
annual compounding. See note la.
It should be noted that the various amounts given in the preceding illustration as
"Value of bond immediately after payment of coupon" are prices at which
the bond would yield 2'/2 per cent per annum to maturity. An examination of a
table showing the prices at which a 4 per cent bond would yield S per cent per
annum will show that, for maturities of 2'/2 years, 2 years, years, 1 year and
1/2year,the prices are $97.68, $98.12, $98.57, $99.03, $99.51.
$2 is 2.047+ per cent of $97.68.
$102 —$97.68=$4.32,which is 4.422 per cent of $97.68.
The 'yield' per annum of a single payment loan (no 'interest' payments)is a
simple function of the geometric averages of the various 'accumulation factors' for
the separate compounding periods, whatever those factors or the rates of which
they are functions may be assumed to be. For example, if the compounding period
be a year, the 'yield' per annum of a single payment loan due in three years and
carrying 4 per cent interest the first year, 5 the second, and 6 the third year is
100 1.04)<1.05X1.O6—1) or a shade less than S per cent.
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On the other hand, the buyer, in making up his own mind as to
what he would be willing to pay for the bond, might use, as his per-
sonal rates of interest, '4 per cent per annum for the first six months,
43/2percent for the next six months, then 5 per cent, 5 3/2percent,
and 6 1/10 per cent. Using these particular rates he would find that
he could afford to pay just $97.68 for the bond. Four per cent, 43/i
per cent, 5 per cent, 53/2percent and 6 1/10 per cent would be the rates
of interest that he considered appropriate and that he was using for the
successive half-yearly periods, but they would not he the 'yield' of the
bond. There would be oniy one 'yield' to the bond, namely, 5 per cent
per annum (23/2 per cent per half-year).
Though we have been emphasizing that there is oniy one 'yield' to
a bond, it does not follow, as we have also suggested above, that be-
cause there is only one 'yield' there is only one rate of interest. Indeed,
there is clear-cut evidence that this is not true. For many economic
purposes the 'yield' of a bond must be considered as an average of
various rates of interest used during successive future periods.6
Variations in the 'yield' of loans of the same grade but of different
maturities would seem not only to offer conclusive evidence that 'yield'
should be thought of as an average, but also to throw some light on
the implicit interest rates for the successive years. Both municipalities
and corporations often offer 'serial' bonds with a large choice of ma-
turity, the various maturities having different 'yields'. For example,
on May 15, 1930, the City of Detroit, Michigan, offered to the public
$9,350,000 of 434percent bonds of which not less than $227,000
matured each May f5 froni May 15, 1931 to May 15, 1960. The
'yields' at which the various maturities were offered were: 1931, 3.50
per cent; 1932, 4.00 per cent; 1933, 4.10 per cent; 1934, 4.20 per
cent; 1935 to 1960 inclusive, 4.25 'per cent.
If the above 'yields' were properly adjusted to the market, and if
costs of underwriting are excluded, the City of Detroit could, on May
15, 1930, borrow for one year at 3.50 per cent. Unless the city would
have had to pay, on May 15, 1931, more than 4 per cent to borrow
(Footnoteconcluded)
When there are 'interest payments' the 'average' is of a less simple and unweighted
kind than in the case of a single-payment loan. But it is essentially an average.
6Thedifferent rates of interest for the successive periods covered by the bond
must, of course, be such that they give the same total present value as would be
obtained by assuming the uniform rate of interest called the 'yield'.30 fOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
for anotheryear,it would have been cheaper to make two separate
successive loans, each running one year, than to borrow for two years
at 4 per cent, as the second maturity proposes. Indeed, a little com-
putation will prove that unless the city would have had to pay on
May 15, 1931 as high a rate as 4.524percent, it would have been as
cheap to borrow twice, each time for one year (once on May 15,
1930 at 3.50 per cent, and again on May 15, 1931 at 4.524 per cent),
as it was to borrow once for two years at 4 per cent.7
If the schedule of 'yields' has any logical foundation it must mean
that the Detroit municipal authorities or their banking advisers con-
sidereci (whether quite consciously or not) 3.50 per cent a 'proper' rate
of interest to use during the first year and 4.524 per cent a 'proper'
rate to use during the second year. Assuming then these two rates of
interest, we may from the 'yield' (4.10 per cent) of the bond maturing
in three years (May 15, 1933) discover the implicit rate of interest
assumed to be proper the third year. Proceeding in this manner we
find that the 'yields' for the successive maturities of these Detroit
bonds implicitly involve a set of interest rates for the successive years.
These implicit interest rates are 3.500 per cent, 4.524 per cent, 4.3 11
per cent, 4.529 per cent, 4.475 per cent, 4.247 per cent, 4.250 per cent
Ifa 4'% percentbond having two years to run 'yields' 4 per cent,it sells for
$100.476. How such a bond may just as well be considered as giving a return of
3.50 per cent per annum during the first year and 4.524 per cent per annum during
the second year, as 4 per cent per annum during both years, is shown in the fol-
lowing table(the error of one cent on a thousand dollar bond results from
dropping decimals):
Price paid for the bond $100.476
Accrued interest (1.75 per cent of $100.476) 1.758
Value of bond just before payment of 1st coupon 1022.34
Payment of. 1st coupon 2.125
Value of bond immediately after payment of 1st coupon 100.109
Accrued interest (1.75 per cent of $100.109) 1.752
Value of bond just before payment of 2nd coupon 101.861
Payment of 2nd coupon , 2.125
Value of bond immediately after payment of 2nd coupon 99.736
Accrued interest (2.262 per cent of $99.736) 2.256
Value of bond just before payment of 3d coupon 101.992
Payment of 3d coupon 2.125
Value of bond immediately after payment of 3d coupon 99.867
Accrued interest (2.262 per cent of $99.867) 2.259
The amount the holder of the bond receives at maturity—$100.00 principal
plus $2.125 interest called for by the 4th coupon $102.126CONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 31
(for the seventh year and for each succeeding year up to May 15,
1960).
On the same date (May 15, 1930) that the City of Detroit offered
to the public the bonds just discussed, the New York Central Rail-
road Company offereçl a series of percent Equipment Trust Cer-
tificates with the same maturities as the Detroit bonds.8 The 'yields'
at which the various maturities were offered were: 1931, 4.00 per cent;
1932, 4.20 per cent;1933,4.35 per cent; 1934, 4.40 per cent; 1935—45
inclusive, 4.50 per cent. The interest rates for the successive years
implicit in these 'yields' are: 4.000 per cent, 4.4 12 per cent, 4.668 per
cent, 4.564 per cent, 4.949 per cent, 4.500 per cent (for the sixth year
and for each succeeding year up to May 15, 1945). A comparison of
these figures with the corresponding figures for the Detroit city bonds
shows that the two series are not very similar. While the railroad
offers a full one-half per cent per annum more on the one-year notes,
its two-year notes yield only one-fifth per cent per annum more than
the city's two-year notes. As a result of these facts the implicit rate
of discount for the second year is actually less for the railroad than
for the city. Both the railroad and the city implicit interest series are
quite irregular. For example, the city series shows a sharp peak in the
second year and the railroad series a sharp peak in the fifth year. For
the third year the city series is lower than in either the second or fourth
year while the railroad series is higher than in either the second or
fourth year. Similarly, the fourth year shows a maximum for the city
series and a minimum for the railroad series.
By June 1931 the New York Central Railroad was offering more of
this same series of percent Equipment Trust Certificates (dated
May 15, 1930 and maturing serially May 1932 to May 15, 1945).
The 'yields' at which the various maturities were offered, however,
were startlingly different from what they had been in May 1930. For
the successive maturities the 'yields' were:
YEAR PER CENT YEAR PER CENT YEAR PER CENT
1932 2.00 . 1937 3.625 1942 3.85
1933 3.00 1938 3.70 1943 3.90
1934 3.50 1939 3.70 1944 3.90
1935 3.50 1940 3.70 1945 3.95
1936 3.625 1941 3.80
SExceptthat May 15, 1945 is the last maturity of the New York Central bonds,
and May 15, 1960 the last maturity of the Detroit bonds.32 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
This series shows irregularities in the implicit interest rates quite
similar to those inherent in the two preceding illustrations. For example,
the implicit interest rate for the fourth year is much lower than that
for either the third or fifth year.
The successive short term interest rates that are implicit in the
'yields' of serial bonds at the issue prices seem only by accident ever
to be other than quite erratic. For example, while the mere fact that
the future was unknown might explain why the Detroit authorities
were willing to pay higher rates than 3.50 per cent on the longer term
bonds, if the payment of such higher rates were necessary to complete
their financing with the maturities they desired, it can hardly explain
the curious ups and downs shown by the sequence of the various im-
plicit short term (annual) rates. Any rational decision as to what
should be the 'yields' assigned to the successive maturities in a group of
serial bonds logically involves a conscious forecast of successive short
term interest rates. It does not seem possible that the erratic short
term rates implicit in the Detroit serial bonds (or in either of the two
New York Central emissions) were the result of a detailed and definite
set of forecasts of future short term rates or even that they were the
result of the superimposing of a forecast of the future financial condi-
tion of the city (or the railroad) on any reasonable forecast of general
market short term rates. In practice, the city authorities probably de-
cided first upon the maturities and the amount to come due on each
maturity and then made a rough-and-ready guess of the various 'yields'
that would suffice to sell the bonds. We cannot even say that the
'yields' are estimates by the issuing group of the current appraisal of
future short term rates by the bond-buying public. The rates them-
selves offer almost conclusive evidence that no such appraisal is made
by either the issuing group Or the bond-buying public. The primary
reason that implicit short term rates are nearly always erratic would
seem to be that they are almost never the result of conscious fore-
casting. Though they are mathematically implicit in the various 'yields'
no recognition is given to that fact.°
The reader must not, from the above discussion, assume that we consider 'yield'
to be a useless concept. Though it must be thought of as an average, it is an aver-
age of which we cannot discover the individual items. The fact that a train makes
a 100 mile run at an 'average' speed of 40 miles an hour is a piece of real informa-
tion even if we know nothing about its speed at various times and places. We have
seen that even the 'implicit' rates which may be obtained from the 'yields' of serialCONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 33
If future rates for the highest grade of six-month obligations were
being accurately forecast, abondof the highest grade would, theoret-
ically, realize in each future half-yearly period between coupons the
return as that carried by six-month obligations at the beginning
of the period. The price of the bond must fluctuate in such a manner as
to attain this objective. If in a tight short term money market in
which six-month obligations of the highest grade are selling on a 7
per cent per annum basis, a 4 per cent bond be selling at par, its price
at the end of the six-month period must have risen to $101.50, if it is to
show a return of 7 per cent per annum for the six-month period. This,
of course, means a fall in the 'yield' during the six months. To preserve
the theoretical relationship between present long term and future short
term interest rates, the 'yields' of bonds of the highest grade should
fall during a period in which short term rates are higher than the yields
of the bonds and rise during a period in which short term rates are
lower.10 Now experience is more nearly the opposite. The forecasting
of short term interest rates by long term interest rates is, in general,
so bad that the student may well begin to wonder whether, in fact,
there really is any attempt to forecast.
However, an examination of the courses of 'time' and 'call' money
rates offers almost conclusive evidence that forecasting is really at-
tempted and that at least one reason it is so badly done is that it is so
difficult. Both 'time loans' and 'call loans' are loans made to stock
brokers with stocks and/or bonds as collateral. The only outstanding
(Footnoteconcluded)
bonds are largely mathematical deductions from economic material which cannot
bear the strain of such analysis. Furthermore, even if we knew the forecasts of
future short term rates impLicit in the 'yield' of a bond, we would, for many pur-
poses, prefer the average. Not only has it the advantage of brevity that is possessed
by all averages, but it also has a lack of ambiguity that the individual items could
not possess. We must remember that, while the 'yield:'is the same for the buyer as
for the seller of the bond, the individual estimates of future short term rates may
be different for each buyer and seller in the market. Even the implicit rates derived
from serial bonds are, at best, onlyshortterm rates in the minds of the corporation's
officials. We must not forget that any particular thaturity may fail to sell, or, if the
series is sold as a unit, the prices that later emerge in the open market may be
quite different from those of the original issue.
Ingeneral, though less accurately, the prices should rise in periods of high short
time interest rates and fall in periods of low short time rates. Fall or rise in 'yield'
is, of not necessarily associated with rise or fall in price. If a bond selling
above par is to retain a constant 'yield' it must fall in price continually. In a similar
manner a bond selling below par must rise in price.34 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
difference between the two types of loan is the length of time they
run. 'Call loans' run 24 hours; 'time loans' run from one to six months.
Now, if it were actually known that money placed on 'call' for the next
ninety days would yield exactly 6 per cent per annum, no bank or
other lender would place money on 'time' for that period at a lower
rate than 6 per cent per annum. Generally the lenders would insist upon
a little more than 6 per cent to recompense them for having their funds
in a less liquid condition. As periods of high call rates are periods of
disturbed monetary conditions,thisdifferential would be greater
when the next ninety days are to show high call rates than when they
are to show low call rates.
In line with these facts, 90-day time loan rates would, theoretically,
always be as high as or higher than an average (of the type described
in note 5)ofcall rates for the succeeding ninety days.In periods
preceding low call rates, 90-day time rates would range only a little
higher than the average call rate for the next ninety days but, in
periods preceding high call rates, time rates would range appreciably
higher than the average call rate for the next ninety days. Moreover,
unless the movements of the differential were very erratic, 90-day
time rates would, week by week and month by month, show the same
ups and downs as the average of call loan rates for the next ninety
days. Furthermore, as they would move with an average of future
callloan rates, they would reach maxima and minima distinctly earlier
than call loan rates. In general, we would expect 90-day time loan
rates to reach maxima and minima about 45 days (or 1months)
before call loan rates. What are the facts?
In the first place, a comparison of 90-day time loan rates with aver-
ages of call loan rates for the next ninety days shows that the time
rates usually range higher than the call averages, as theory would
lead us to expect. However, the relation of the magnitudes of the dif-
ferentials to the levels of the call rates is not what we might anticipate
under good forecasting. When the future call averages are low, the
time rates almost always range much higher than those averages;
when the future call averages are high, the time rates range little if
any higher than the averages. When the future call averages are
extraordinarily high the time rates are commonly lower than the aver-
ages. Seldom do the time rates correctly forecast a period of extraor-
dinarily high call rates. Even when they reach as high a maximum asCONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 35
the call averages, the maximum usually occurs too late to constitute
any forecast. Over and over again, in a period immediately preceding
high call rates, it was possible to borrow on time and relenci on call
(during the 'time' period) at a large profit.
An examination of a chart on which are plotted 90-day time money
rates and the averages of call money rates for each succeeding ninety
days reveals little evidence of good forecasting. When 4- or 6-month
time money rates are similarly compared with the proper averages of
future call money rates, even less evidence of good forecasting is forth-
coming. This applies not only to time money levels but also to the timing
of movements and the positions of maxima and minima. Time loan
rates fail to forecast call loan rates because neither borrowers nor
lenders of money on 'time' know much more than nothing at all about
the future course of call loan rates.
But this is not the whole story. Before the Federal Reserve system
went into operation both call and time loan rates showed pronounced
seasonal fluctuations. The existence of these seasonal fluctuations was
almost universally recognized and their chief characteristics were fairly
well known. It was admitted that both call money rates and time money
rates contained two elements—a seasonal and a non-seasonal. Under
such circumstances, would it not be natural to believe that the poor
forecasting of call money rates by time money rates was the result
of poor forecasting of the non-seasonal element in the call money
rates and to expect that the time money seasonal would, upon examina-
tion, be found actually to forecast the call money seasonal P
At last we have arrived at something that was really known about
future short time interest rates, and we find the theory that forecasting
is necessarily attempted is at last upheld by the data. The time money
seasonal shows unmistakable evidences of attempted forecasting of the
call money seasonal, as may be seen by comparing the monthly seasonal
for time money rates (Chart 20") with a three-month moving average
of the monthly seasonal for call money rates.'2It is true that the lag
of the three-month average call money seasonal is usually closer to one
month than it is to the one month and a half which the theory would in
general demand. However, the essential thing is that there is a distinct
lag; the time money seasonal moves before the call money
Forthe figures see Appendix A, Table 22.
12 For the figures see Appendix A, Table 21.
18 This may be clearly seen from Chart 20 where the two seasonals are presented.36 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
Here we have evidence of definite and relatively successful I ore-
casting. The chief trouble seems to be, not that the time money seasonal
does not move early enough, but that it does not move far enough.
its fluctuations are too small. Year after year the fluctuations of the
three-month moving average of the call money monthly seasonal are
greater than the fluctuations of the time money monthly seasonal. The
borrowers and lenders of time money seemed loath to adjust their
rates completely to what they knew of the call money seasonal. This is
somewhat strange because profits could have been made by those who
noticed the discrepancy. Before the Federal Reserve system went into
effect stock brokers should have borrowed more heavily on. call for
the first eight months of the year and more heavily on time for the
last four months of the year.
If, from call and time loan rates we eliminate the seasonal fluctua-
tions, and then compare the two resulting series, we find the forecast-
ing even worse than for the two original, unadjusted series. Bankers
and brokers acted as if they knew virtually nothing about future
cyclical or other non-seasonal movements of call money rates. They
did know something about the seasonal fluctuations. What they knew
about they were able to forecast, at least approximately; what they
did not know about they were unable to forecast at all—except by
accident.
In much of the preceding discussion of the relations that, theoreti-
cally, would exist between long and short term interest rates we have
implicitly made one fundamental assumption which in actual practice
may or may not be. warranted: the assumption of In con-
nection with any loan there are always two rates of interest which
may or may not be the same: first, there is the promised or hypothetical
yield, which can be calculated at the time the loan is made or the
bond is purchased, but which may never materialize; second, there
is the realized or actual yield which cannot be known until the last
payment has been made. If a 4 per cent bond, maturing in 30 years,
be purchased at 90 and held for years, and if, during that time,
forty-five $2.00 payments be made but no payments of any kind there-
after, the promised yield is 4.62 per cent but the realized yield is zero
per cent. Only on the assumption of absolute certainty of payment is
it legitimate to say that the promised yield of a bond shoi.ild logically
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future short term interest rates. In actual practice, a forecast that is
quite distinct from any forecast of short term interest rates is in-
troduced into the determination of the promised yield—the forecast
of the degree of' certainty of the future payments. The realized yield
is not, Of-course, a forecast at all, as it does not come into existence
until after the event.'4
Realized yield concerns the real though unknown future; promised
yield concerns a hypothetical future which may or may not materialize.
It is a mere forecast. However, though the realized yield has, in this
sense, a reality that the promised yield does not possess, it is the prom-
ised yield that is almost invariably referred to when the word 'yield' is
used without designating its meaning. The 'yield' of a bond is the prom-
ised yield. This fact must never be forgotten. Its recognition clears up
many theoretical difficulties.
In calculating the 'yield' of a bond the assumption is made that all
future interest payments and the principal payment will be made on the
dates specified in the bond. Of course, such an assumption is neces-
sarily absurd in the case of. a perpetuity—such as canadian Pacific
debenture 4's or any 'preferred' stock. The chance that all future pay-
ments will be niade is negligibly small for any extremely long term
bond, such as West Shore 4's of 2361. The importance of this condition
from a practical standpoint may, of course, easily be overemphasized.
If West Shore 4's of 2361 are bought to yield 5 per cent per annum
to maturity, the price paid will be $80.00 for each $100 face value of
the bond. This $80.00 present payment may be distributed as follows:
$73.23 is paid for the interest payments of the first fifty years, $6.20
for the interest payments of the next fifty years, and only 57 cents for
all succeeding interest payments and the payment of the principal sum
—on. the assumption of a uniform interest rate of 5 per cent per annum
for all future inter-coupon periods.
'Certainty of payment' is for most purposes a purely psychological
concept. Only to the extent that it is an opinion in the minds of buyers
and sellers can it affect the price of bonds. Security in the opinion of
buyers and sellers is cornnionly spoken of as though it were security
in fact. Security in fact can be known only when the future has be-
14Inthe light of promised and rea.li.zed rates of interest, the concept of 'pure in-
terest'(as a promised rate)isseen to be a merely psychological concept. The
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come the past. As the future cannot be known security is always rela-
tive; absolute security is a pseudo idea. An actual bond (before ma-
turity) can never be absolutely secure in fact. So many buyers and
sellers of bonds may think of it as absolutely secure that its market
price may act as though it were extremely (though not necessarily
'absolutely') secure. In general, the more buyers and sellers who con-
sider a bond to be absolutely secure or nearly so, the lower will be its
'yield'. There is, however, no point at which one can stop and say
'this is absolute security'.
How arbitrary and unreal, from an economic standpoint, may be
the mathematically necessary assumption of payment is illustrated by
the variation in the 'yields' of bonds containing identical promises as
to future payments—that is, bonds carrying the same 'coupon rate'
and having the same maturity. We immediately realize that, for bonds
having the highest 'yields', such 'yields' are merely 'promised' and
will probably never be 'realized'. From an economic standpoint they
are primarily indexes of lack of confidence in the certainty of the future
payments rather than indexes of how those payments would at present
be valued—if there were perfect assurance that they would be paid on
the promised dates.
The assumption of payment (which must be made before the 'yield'
can be calculated) is seen to be, in such cases, if not an assumption
demonstrably contrary to fact, at least of very dubious' validity. 'Prom-
ised' yield is not necessarily 'realized' yield.
The concept of 'pure' or 'riskiess' interest is metaphysical. The prac-
tical contrast is not between 'pure' and 'impure' but between 'promised'
or 'expected' and 'actual' or 'realized'. It is quite quixotic to attempt
to divide the 'promised' (or even 'realized') return from a bond into
'interest' and 'profits' or something else. Moreover, such a division is
unnecessary for either theoretical or historical treatment. Bonds and
other interest-bearing obligations may be classified according to their
('promised') yields without introducing the concept of 'pure interest',
and the economic significance of such yields may be studied without
deciding what the rate of 'riskiess' yield would be. All rates of inter-
est are of economic importance. The movements of the yields of sec-
ond grade bonds sometimes have a much more direct bearing on
changes in economic conditions than the movements 'of the yields of
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quality may actually fall during a period of great business disturbance
and distrust—while the yields of second grade bonds are rising. The
existence at any time of an abnormally large volume of bonds selling
at prices that show extremely high 'yields' is almost certain to be of
great economic significance, even though it is not necessarily any evi-
dence that 'long term interest rates as such' are extremely high.
Sometimes distrust of all securities becomes so great that 'in'vest-
ment' deteriorates into 'ho.arding'. Many erstwhile investors now de-
mand actual cash, in extreme cases actual specie.Even the highest
grade bonds are no longer acceptable. The hoarder demands what he
believes to be 'absolute security'. He will accept zero or even negative
interest (rent of a safe deposit box). However, such a condition differs
only in degree and not in kind from the more commonly occurring
flight from the lower grade long term securities into the highest grade
short term obligations.
Generally speaking, the relative, economic importance of securities
of various grades varies with their total market values.If any large
proportion of the total market value of securities outstanding in a
community is by most persons considered absolutely safe, fluc-
tuations in the yield of those securities are, of course, of great economic
importance. On the other hand, in a community where there are
alniost no investments that are generally considered superlatively safe,
fluctuations in the yield of such investments are of only academic
interest. While movements of the yield of securities considered su-
perlatively safe might be of great importance in a community such as
England in the last years of the nineteenth century,it would have
little significance in a community such as California in the 1850's.
When money in California was commonly lending at 18 to 24 per cent
per annum, some few individuals were undoubtedly satisfied to invest
in securities yielding them less than 6 per cent per annum. Fluctuations
in the yield of such securities were of little economic significance in that
community at that time.
The destructive effects of a fall in the prices of bonds are not neces-
sarily dependent on whether the bonds were originally (before the
fall) considered high or low grade. The chief reasons that usually make
a fall in the prices of high grade bonds more serious than a fall in
the prices of low grade bonds are two. In the first place, the total
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much greater than the valueof the iow grade bonds. In the sec-
ond place, banks usually invest more heavily in high grade bonds than
in low grade bonds, and anything that affects the solvency or even
liquidity of the banks is always peculiarly serious. In periods when
banks are carrying a large volume of low grade bonds, a fall in the
prices of those bonds may be almost as serious as a fall in the prices of
high grade bonds.
Not only the economic importance of the yield of investments that
are considered superlatively safe but also the yield itself is affected
by changes in the volume of such securities available. The yields of
securities of even as high a grade as United States Liberty Bonds and
Treasury Certificates have in the past often been unmistakably respon-
sive to the larger fluctuations in the amount outstanding. This is not,
to any appreciable extent, the result of a general belief that certainty
of payment is affected more than negligibly by such fluctuations.It
merely illustrates the fact that an increase in the volume of even such
securities does not automatically create new purchasers—except at
lower prices—any more than an increase in the supply of a coninioclity
creates new purchasers—except at lower prices.15
Furthermore, the volume of investment funds demanding the high-
est degree of safety is affected by changing opportunities for earnings
in less secure investments. The relation of the yield of the highest
grade investments to the yield of other investments is always impor-
tant. Seldom do many persons demand security at any price. Usually,
many are willing to take risks with the hope of larger returns than
they could obtain from investments that they consider 'absolutely
secure'. If the speculative opportunities connected with investments
that are believed to have some element of risk seem to increase, the
proportion of the investment funds of the country that will demand
'absolute security'will probably decline. The yield of 'absolutely
secure' investments will advance. If the opportunities connected with
investments recognized as having some element of risk seem to de-
cline or if the risks seem to have increased, the proportion of the in-
vestment funds of the country demanding great or 'absolute' security
will probably increase.
The evil effects of a pronounced rise in the yield of any class of
Inspitepartial offsetting by the possibility of 'discounting'at the Federal
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bond are, for some purposes,16 more easily understood if we speak, as
we did a few paragraphs back, in terms of a fall in price. For example,
the great damage is done by the fall in the prices of bonds already on
theniarket, not by the rise in the rates of interest that corporations
that wish to engage in new borrowing will have to pay. The effect of
the fall in the prices of outstanding obligations is in the present. The
effect of the higher yields of the new bonds is in the future. A fall
in the prices of bonds actually outstanding immediately affects the
financial position of all their holders, while the drain on the resources
of a borrowing company, that results from a rise in the rate it must
pay on a new issue, will extend over the life of the bond. The first
has a concentrated and immediate effect; the effect of the second is
spread out thinly over many future years.
A pronounced fall in the price of bonds actually outstanding is se-
rious not only because it destroys present purchasing power, but also
because it leads. to one of the vicious circles of the business cycle. If
the bonds have been used as collateral for loans, that collateral must
he increased or a part of the loan must be repaid. If it he repaid by
selling some of the bonds, such 'distress selling' tends to lower the
price of the bonds just as directly as does the forced selling of any
commodity. Contrary to ordinary economic assumptions, things are
being sold, not because they are dear, but because they are cheap."
From a theoretical standpoint it would seem that major fluctuations
in the yields (or prices) of bonds of the highest grade should be rela-
tively more important in periods of prosperity than in periods of de-
i6 In discussing the action of bonds in the business cycle it sometimes seems easier
to think in terms of pricethanin terms of yield. Why should we not substitute price
for yield in all our discussions? Probably the simplest way to answer this question
is to point out that 'yield' may often be a better way to measure price than prices
themselves. It measures a corrected rather than a raw price.It may be considered
as the reciprocal of an adjusted price—a price that has been corrected for varying
coupon rates and maturities. Though it is highly desirable to remember the iniplica-
tions involved in 'yield', those implications do not need to frighten us from using
the concept.It is not only extremely useful but almost necessary.
17 This vicious circle is, of course, made still more vicious by those who sell, be-
cause they become afraid that prices may go so low that they would eventually
be forced to sell—or merely because they believe prices are going lower.
Economists have usually underemphasized the importance of price movements
as compared with price levels in inducing purchases or sales. In the speculative
markets, commodities and securities are as often bought because their prices have
been going up, or sold because their prices have been going down, as because their
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pression. As bonds of the highest grade are those bonds which are
generally so considered, there are naturally more of them in periods
of prosperity than in periods of depression. A rise in the yield of bonds
of the highest grade occurring in the midst of a period of prosperity
should be of greater significance than a fall in their yield in a period
of depression. Of course this reasoning is somewhat complicated by
the fact that a rise in yield (or fall in price) always exerts positive
pressure, while the effects of a fall in yield (or rise in price) are largely
negative; it creates opportunities rather than necessities or compul-
sions. An examination of the historical facts strongly supports the
thesis that a rise in the yield of interest-bearing obligations of the
highest grade—whether they be of long or short maturity—has greater
power to terminate a period of prosperity than has a fall in their yields
to initiate such a period.
We have seen that, if 'promised' rates were 'realized' and if long
term rates accurately forecast short term rates, it would be relatively
unimportant to an investor whether he bought long or short term
securities. If he bought short term when he really needed long, he
would have to be continually reinvesting; and, if he bought long when
he needed short, he would have to sell. But both the short and the
long term returns 'realized' would be the same whether they were
obtained from a succession of short term investments or from a long
term investment with possibilities of sale. The price fluctuations of a
long term bond would he exactly sufficient to adjust the successive
implicit short term rates of the future rates for future
short term loans—no more and no less. The price fluctuations of the
bond would therefore be unaffected by the interval to maturity. A 4 per
cent bond selling at $90 must rise to $91.15 in six months if the
return is to be 7 per cent per annum for those six months—whether
the bond matures in five years or a century.
Of course, bond prices do not move this way in the actual market.
Not only do they tend to fall rather than rise in periods of short term
stringency, but also the more distant their maturity the greater are their
price fluctuations. The price fluctuations of the highest grade
maturing in ten years tend to be appreciably greater than the price
fluctuations of those maturing in two or three years. But the increase
in price fluctuation resulting from an increase in time to maturity is
not as great as it would be withconstancy of yield fluctuation. The
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longer the maturity the smaller the yield fluctuations—though, because
the pricefluctuationsincrease with an increase in time to maturity
(rather than remain constant), the decrease in extent of fluctuation in
yield with lengthening of time to maturity is not nearly so great as it
would be if the long term rates accurately forecast the short term
rates.18 The longer the maturity of a bond the greater are the price
fluctuations, and hence the greater are the fluctuations in the actual
short time return realized by buying at the beginning and selling at the
end of the short time period.If we define the 'ninety-day yield of a
bond' on a particular date as the return that would have been realized
if the bond had been bought on that date and sold (without commis-
sions) ninety days later, we find that the 'ninety-day yields' of even
the highest grade long term bonds have usually fluctuated much more
violently than ninety-day time money rates—ustially more violently
than even ninety-day averages of call money rates.
An important reason why bond yields (and prices)fluctuate as
much as they do is that few buyers of long term bonds buy them with
the intention of holding them to maturity. They expect to sell them
at some indefinite time in the future. Now to determine what the sell-
ing price will be at any particular future date requires something more
than even absolute assurance that all interest payments and the prin-
cipal payment will be met on the dates specified in the bond, and exact
knowledge (if it were attainable) of future short time interest rates
for the entire life of the bond. The buyer must know what will be
the opinion of buyers and sellers concerning these matters on that
future date—and whether the future buyers will also be not
only willing but able to pay. They can not be forced to buy. Unlike
short time loans, long time loans are not 'self liquidating'. Prior to
its distant maturity, nobody has to buy or retire a particular long term
bond at a particular time or go into bankruptcy. This is why it is so
peculiarly inappropriate for banks to place any large percentage of
their demand funds in long term bonds.
The fact that long term bonds are bought and sold and not neces-
sarily or even usually held to maturity makes us realize again the
artificiality of the concept of security in the case of 'promised' yield.
Mere length of time introduces an element of real insecurity in all long
18 The movements of time and call money rates offer an exception to this
tion.Time money rates have fluctuated lessthanthey would have if they had
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term loans. Only short term loans can be even imagined to be 'ab-
solutely secure'. Who can make even a good guess as to what a par-
ticular long term bond will be selling for two years from now? Yet
such a guess is an essential element of the 'security' of any short term
loan that is to be made by buying the long term bond now and selling
it two years hence.
We have, so far in this chapter, been discussing the subject of long
time interest rates without asking the question: how much longer
term is one loan than another? For a study of the relations between
long and short time interest rates, it would seem highly desirable to
have some acleciuate measure of 'longness'. Let us use the word 'dura-
tion' to signify the essence of the time element in a loan. If one loan
is essentially a longer term loan than another we shall speak of it as
having greater 'duration'.
Now the promise contained in a loan is either a promise to make
one and only one future payment or a promise to make more than
one future payment. If two loans are made at the same rate of inter-
est, and if each loan involves a promise to make one future payment
only, the loan whose future payment is to be made earlier is clearly
a shorter term loan than the other. For example, if $100 be lent for
one year at 5 per cent per annum, the only payment to be $105 at the
end of the year, and if another $100 he lent for two years at 5 per
cent per annum, the only paymeht to he $1 10.25 at the end of the two
years, the first loan is clearly a shorter term loan than the second. If,
on the other hand, either or both loans involve a promise to make
more than one future payment, or if the rates of interest ascribed to
the two loans are not the same, it may be extremely to decide
which is essentially the longer term loan.
It is clear that 'number of years to maturity' is a most inadequate
measure of 'duration'. We must remember that the 'maturity' of a
loan is the date of the last and final payment only. It tells us nothing
about the sizes of any other payments or the dates on which they are
to be made. It is clearly only one of the factors determining 'duration'.
Sometimes, as in the case of a low coupon, short term bond, it may
be overwhelmingly the most important factor. At other times, as in
the case of a long term, diminishing annuity, its importance may be
so small as to be almost negligible. Because of its nature, length ofCONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 45
time to maturity is not an accurate or even a good measure of 'dura-
tion'. 'Duration' is a reality of which 'maturity' is only one factor.
Whether one bond represents an essentially shorter or an essentially
longer term loan than another bond depends not only upon the respec-
tive 'maturities' of the two bonds but also upon their respective 'coupon
rates'—and, under certain circumstances, on their respective 'yields'.
Only if maturities, coupon rates and yields are identical can we say,
without calculation, that the 'durations' of two bonds are the same.
If two bonds have the same maturity arid the same yield but one
has a higher coupon rate than the other, the one having the higher
coupon rate represents. an essentially shorter term loan than the other.
For example, if each bond is selling on a 5 per cent basis, a 6 per
cent bond maturing in 25yearsnecessarily. an essentially
shorter term loan than a 4 per cent bond maturing in 25 years. This
may easily be seen by comparing a $400 face value 6 per cent bond
maturing in 25 years with a $500 face value 4 per cent bond maturing
in 25 years. On both bonds tile total of all future payments, both prin-
cipal and interest, is $1,000. But on tile 6 per cent bond the payments
are $12 each six months for years, and then a final payment of
$412, while Ofl the 4 per cent bond tile payments are $10 each six
months for years, and then a final payment of $510. It is plain
that the $1,000 is being paid earlier Ofl tile 6 than Ofl the 4 per cent
bond. Though both have the same 'maturity', tile 6 per cent bond rep-
resents a loan of shorter 'duration' than the 4 per cent bond.
The difference in 'duration' of the two bonds is manifest in their
prices. As the payments are made earlier on the 6 per cent bond, its
price (if the 'yields' of the two bonds are the same) is necessarily
higher. For example, as each bond 'yields' 5 per cent, the price of the
$400 face value 6 per cent bond will be $456.72, while the price of
the $500.face value 4 per cent bond will be only $429.10.
We see, then, that if two bonds have the same yield and the same
maturity but different coupon rates, the bond having the higher coupon
rate represents the loan of shorter 'duration'. Instead of examining in
a similar manner the case in which the two bonds have the same coupon
rate and the same maturity but different yields, and the case in which
they have the same coupon rate and the same yield but different ma-
turities, we shall now consider directly the general problem of how
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the maturity of a bond as a function of the maturities of the separate
loans of which it may be said to consist.
It would seem almost natural to assume that the 'duration' of any
loan involving more than one future payment should be some sort of
a weighted average of the maturities of the individual loans that corre-
spond to each future payment. Two sets of weights immediately present
themselves—the present and the future values of the various individual
loans.
Future value weighting seems clearly inadmissible. It gives absurdly
long 'durations'. If $2,000 be lent at 5 per cent per annum in the form
of two loans, one of $1,000 at 5 per cent per annumpayable in one
lump sum of $1,050 at the end of one year, and one of $1,000 at 5 per
cent per annum payable in one lump sum of $131,501.26 at the end
of 100years,the 'average maturity' or 'duration' of the two loans, if
calculated by taking an arithmetic average of the two maturities, using
the present values as weights, is 505/2 years. If the future values
($1,050 and $131,501.26) be used as weights, the 'average maturity'
is found to be more than 99 years.
In this illustration, the present values (or amounts lent) were equal.
Let us examine a case in which the future values are equal. If $959.98
be lent at 5 per cent per annum in the form of two loans, one of
$952.38 at 5 per cent per annum payable in one lump sum of $1,000
at the end of one year, and one of $7.60 at 5 per cent per annum
payable in one lump sum of $1,000 at the end of 100 years, the
'average maturity' or 'duration' of the two loans, if calculated by taking
an arithmetic average of the two maturities, using the present values
($952.38 and $7.60) as weights, is about 215/2 months. If the future
values be used as weights, the average maturity is 503/2 years.
How absurd it seems to think of a loan of $2,000 made up of two
loans each of $1,000, one maturing in one year and one in 100 years,
as having a 'duration' of over 99 years. And how absurd to think of
a loan of $1,000 made up of two loans, one of $952.38 maturing in
one year and the other of $7.60—less than 1 per cent of the larger
loan—maturing in 100 years, as having a 'duration' of 505/2 years.2°
19Inthe present discussions, we have not followed the 'semi-annual compounding'
convention. For simplicity of treatment, we have assumed throughout that payments
are made annually and compounding is done
20Ifone billion dollars were to be lent as a single payment loan at 5 per cent per
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But are not the results obtained by using present values as weights
also open to criticism? If the 'durations' obtained by using future value
weighting seem unmistakably too long, does not at least one of the
'durations' obtained from present value weighting seem very short?
Moreover, if the average maturity of two equal future payments
be assumed to be the arithmetic average of the two maturities with
the present values of the future payments as weights, some seemingly
paradoxical results may appear. For example, if the yieldbe 5 per
cent and if the two future payments be $1 at the end of one year and
$1 at the end of 10 years, the average maturity will he about
years.If the dates of payment be one year and 27 years, the average
maturity will be about 6.7 years. But if they be one year and 50 years
the average maturity will be only 5.1 years, and if the dates of pay-
ment be one year and 100 years. the average maturity will be appre-
ciably less than 2 years! In this particular illustration, the average
maturity has a maximum when the second payment is made in about
27 years! However, these results do not seem so ridiculous if we re-
member that, as the date of payment of the second $1 becomes arithmet-
ically more and more distant, its present value, or the amount actually
lent, becomes geometrically smaller and smaller. In the limiting case,
in which the second $1 is paid at infinity, the 'average maturity' is one
year, butamount of the loan for which the second dollar is to be
paid is zero. The argument for present value weighting seems strong.2'
(Footnote ZOconcluded)
for 520 years, future value weighting would give the composite loan a duration of
about260years.
21Theactuaries have proposed and solved a problem that must not be confounded
with ours. It is termed the problem "of finding the equated time for a number of
sums due at different times, or, in other words, the average date at which, on the
basis of an agreed rate of interest, all the sums might be paid without theoretical
advantage or disadvantage to either party" (British) Institute of Actuaries Text-
Book,Part I,pp. 24 and 25.
The answer is a date such that, if the suni. of all the present values of the different
future payments was compounded to that date at the rate of interest used to obtain
those individual present values,it would amount to the sum of allthe future
payments. This is a neat and symmetrical answer to the problem proposed, and it
gives better results in practice than the common method of 'equating time', which
is based on future weighting, but it seems an unreal answer to an unreal question.
It is quite logical in assuming that the present value of the single future payment
must equal the present value of the sum of the individual future payments, but
it seems to beg the question when it also assumes that the future value of the
single payment at the date of its payment must equal the sum of the individual
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Now, if present value weighting be used, the 'duration' of a bond
is an average of the durations of the separate single payment lOans
into which the bond may be broken up. To calculate this average the
duration of each individual single payment loan must be weighted in
proportion to the size of the individual loan; in other words, by the
ratio of the present value of the individual future payment to the sum
of all the present values, which is, of course, the price paid for the
bond.22
Let F = the 'face' value of the bond in dollars, i.e. the 'principal'
sum in dollars;
I = the number of dollars paid semi-annually, i.e. the num-
ber of dollars called for by one 'coupon';
P = the number of dollars paid for the bond, i.e. the 'price'
in dollars;
nthe number of half years the bond has to run, i.e. the
number of half years to 'maturity';
R = the semi-annual rateofthe 'yield', e.g. if the bond is
selling to yield 4 per cent per annum, R = 1.02 (under
the semi-annual convention of the bond tables);
= the ratio of the face value of the bond to a coupon pay-
F 'ment, i.e., Q=
D= the 'duration' of the bond—in half years;
Then
I 21 31 nInF —+--+---+....+—+. RR2 R3
R R2 R8
(Footnote 21concluded)
future payments each at itsparticular date of payment. This assumption
overweights the time importance of distant payments.
22Interms of the symbols of the next paragraph,
I
—F
I II IF I R—1
+—+—=
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Su.mming the terms in the numerator, and in the of this




An examination of this expression for the value of D shows that
tile larger the value of Q the greater the duration; in other words, the
smaller the 'coupon' payments are relatively to the face value of the
bond the greater is the duration of the bond. Furthermore, the larger
the value of R the smaller the duration. D increases with n, though,
if R be greater than 1 +in other words if the bond be selling below




1'the value reached when n equals infinity.
When Q0, in other words, when the series of future payments
constitutes a mere annuity without any 'principal' payment whatever,
R n .
D= — .WhenQ equals infimty, in other words, if
R—1 —1
the loan is single payment, D = n.




D= .Unityis the limiting value of D as R n+Q
approaches infinity.
R QR + n(1+Q—QR)
R—1
R(R"—l—Q+QR) (R—1)[QR + n(1+Q—QR)]
(R—1)
0
which, when 1is substituted for R, takes the indeterminate form of —.However,
the fraction may easily be evaluated by the ordinary methods of the calculus. The
first derivative of the numerator divided by the first derivative of the denominator
is, if R = 1,still indeterminate. However, taking second derivatives, we get
n (ii+1) R"' + ZnQ
ii(n+1) + 2Q —n(n—i) Rn-2
LettingR = 1 in this expression we obtain the value for D given in the text.50 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
When n =1,D = 1. When n equals infinity, as when a bond (such
R
as Canadian Pacific debenture 4's) has no maturity date, D =
R—1
1
But, if R be greater than 1 +—, inother words if the bond be selling
Q
belowpar, D will attain a maximum value before n reaches infinity.24
However, unless R be very large, the value of n making D a maximum
will be large and the maximum value of D will be very little greater
than the value associated with an infinite value for n.25
A short table presenting the relations between time to maturity and
duration, for a 4, a 5,anda 6 per cent bond each selling at par, will
illustrate the ordinary characteristics of the duration concept (p. 51).
The concept of 'duration' throws a flood of light on the fluctuations
of bond yields in the actual market. Not merely do the yields of long
term bonds tend to fluctuate much less violently than the yields of
short term bonds or the rates on short term loans, such as are repre-
sented by commercial paper, but the relation between maturity and
violence of fluctuation in yield is much as we would expect to find it
from our analysis of the nature of 'duration'. While there is a great
difference between the amplitude of the fluctuations in yield of bonds of
24 The explanation of seeming paradoxes of this type has already been discussed.
25 Equating to zero the derivative of D with respect to n leads to an insoluble equa-
tion; but an approximate solution is that, for other than extremely large values of R,
R QR
D will reach a maximum when n is a shade greater than +
R—1QR—Q—1
For example, if a 4 per cent bond be selling on a 6 per cent basis (3 per cent per
R QR
half year on the semi-annual compounding convention), +. will
R—1QR—Q—1
equal and this is approximately the value of ii (in half years) that will, in
fact, make D a maximum. But this maximum value of D, when n equals is
less than 342/3 half years and when n equals infinity D equals half years, a de-
cline of less than two months in its value.
A higher yield will, of course, give a maximum value for D with a smaller value
for n and the difference between the maximum value of D and its value when n
equals infinity will be increased. For example, if the 4 per cent bond be selling on an
R QR
8 per cent basis, + — will equal 78. When D is actually a maxi-
R—1QR—Q—1
mum, n lies between 78 and 79 half years. The maximum value of D is then
slightly less than half years but the value of D when n equals infinity is only 26
half years, a difference of a little more than half a year.CONCEPT OF LONG TERM INTEREST RATES 51
DURATION IN YEARS 26
YEARS 4 PER CENT 5 PER CENT 6.PER CENT
TO MATURITY BOND BOND BOND
1 .990 .987 .985
3 2.857 2.823 2.790
6 5.393 5.257 5.126
10 8.339 7.989 7.662
15 11.422 10.727 10.094
25 16.026 14.536 13.254
50 21.970 18.765 16.273
100 25.014 20.353 17.120
Infinity 25.5 20.5 17.167
extremely short maturity and of those having ten years or so to run,
and an appreciable difference between the fluctuations in yield of the
latter and of bonds having forty-five or fifty years to run, there is
virtually no discernible difference between the action of these last
bonds and the action of those having a hundred years or more to run.
The concept is, of course, full of theoretical difficulties.It is easy
to think of the 'duration' of a bond as increasing while the time to
maturity is decreasing, if 'long term interest rates' are declining during
the period.It would seem only logical, for the purposes of our prob-
lem, to think of time not in terms of years or months but in terms of
its relation to the growth of capital. But in all our illustrations we
have, for purposes of computation, used as 'yield' the yield of the mdi-
viducd bond whose 'duration' we were discussing.This amounts to
assuming that 'duration' is lengthened by mere increase of security as
well as bya true decrease in the 'preference for present over (assured)
future money'.
But this assumption leads us into one of the quagmires of 'pure' in-
terest. Are the promised future payments of a low grade bond really
26 If the interest were payable and compounded annually, instead of semi-annually,
the durations would be slightly greater than those given above, the difference increas-
ing with increases in the time to maturity. For infinite maturities they would be one-
half year greater, that is 26, 21 and 172/3 years instead of 25'/2, 20T/2 and 17 1/6 years.
If the ordinary concept of 'equated time' (see note 21) were used to calculate
duration, no maximum values would appear. A bond with an infinite maturity like
British Consols or Canadian Pacific debenture 4's would have an infinite duration.
A 6 per cent bond selling at par and maturing in 10 years would have a duration of
7.95 yearS (instead of 7.66 as in the text table), if it matured in 25 years its dura-
tion would be 15.50 years (instead of 13.25), for 50 years its duration would be
23.45 (instead of 16.27), for 100 years 32.92 (instead of 17.12), and ifit matured
in 200 years its duration would be 43.39 years instead of less than 17 1/6 years as in
the text table.52 BOND YIELDS AND STOCK PRICES
discounted at higher rates than the promised future payments of a high
grade bond, or is the difference in 'yield' traceable not to any difference
in rates of discount but to a difference in what is discounted, this being,
in the case of an ultra high grade bond, the actually promised payments.
but, in the case of a low grade bond, the mathematical 'expectations'
that result from multiplying each promised payment by the assumed
probability that it will be met? 27
Anotherdifficulty connected with the problem will be merely men-
tioned. \Ve have made the assumption that the rate of interest for each
future six period is the rate corresponding to the 'yield' of the
bond. Now the •reader realizes that this assumption may easily be
contrary to fact. However, we drew attention, earlier in this chapter,
to the insuperable difficulties conneèted with any attempt •to discover
the real rates of discount for each half-yearly period in the future.If
we knew these future discount rates we might then be able to state that
two bonds which, at different dates, each had the same number of years
to run, the same coupon rate and •the same 'yield' had quite different
durations.
If, for example, the 'yield' of the earlier bond involved a set of rela-
tively high discount rates for the years of the immediate future and
low discount rates for the succeeding years to maturity, while this con-
dition was reversed for the later bond., the earlier bond would have a
longer duration than the later bond. Because the coupon rates, yields
and maturities are identical, the prices of the two bonds will be the
same. In Other words, the sum of the present values of the future pay-
ments will he the same. Hence that bond in which the earlier payments
are relatively heavily discounted, and therefore the 'weights' applicable
to the shorter constituent maturities are relatively light, will have a
longer duration.
The difficulties connected with the problem of arriving at a com-
pletely satisfactory concept of 'duration' are, indeed, extremely great.
Any proposed solution almost necessarily involves some paradoxes.
We have tried to open the reader's eyes to the existence of the problem.
The logical atmosphere in which the analysis has had to be carried on
may seem to have been somewhat rarefied at times; but we believe that,
if the reader has followed the arguments carefully, lie will at least not
But see Ch. III, note8.CONCEPT OF LONG TERMINTERESTRATES
accusethewriterbeing like the good Puritan knight who, in re-
ligious controversy,
•.couldraise scruples dark and nice,
And after solve 'em in a trice
As if Divinity had catch'd
The itch, on purpose to be scratch'cl."